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LEGAL ISSUES IN MEDICINE
THE HEALTH OF THE PRESIDENT AND 
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES
The Public’s Right to Know
GEORGE J. ANNAS, J.D., M.P.H.
IN July 1995, presidential candidate Robert Dole cel-
ebrated his 72nd birthday by releasing a detailed nine-
page summary of his medical records.1 His personal
physician told the press that despite the serious wounds
Dole received during World War II, which left his right
arm paralyzed and required the removal of one kidney,
and despite his 1991 surgery for prostate cancer, his
health was “excellent.”1,2 Dole was also photographed
on his treadmill.
Since 1972, when George McGovern was forced to re-
place his vice-presidential running mate, Thomas Ea-
gleton, after it was disclosed that Eagleton had been
hospitalized for depression, the health status of presi-
dential candidates has been seen as fair game by the
press. In the 1976 presidential campaign, virtually all
the candidates except Eugene McCarthy supplied sum-
maries of their medical histories to the press.3 Senator
McCarthy argued that medical records were private,
and in 1992 candidate Bill Clinton also appealed to pri-
vacy when he initially refused to release detailed medi-
cal information, saying he would release his medical rec-
ords should he be elected President. But the day after
physician-reporter Lawrence Altman wrote a front-page
story in The New York Times asserting that “Mr. Clinton
has been less forthcoming about his health than any
Presidential nominee in the last 20 years,” Clinton
promised to make more medical information available
to the press immediately.4,5 Ross Perot, however, re-
leased no medical information during the campaign.
During every presidential campaign season (and this
one has started very early), we ask the same question:
How much information about the health of a presiden-
tial candidate does the public have a right to? Clinton’s
promise to open his medical records should he be elect-
ed President4 poses a related question: How much does
the public have a right to know about the health of the
President?
MEDICAL PRIVACY AND THE PRESIDENT
It is a central legal and ethical principle that physi-
cians should not disclose private medical information to
people who are not involved in a patient’s care without
the patient’s authorization.6 The doctor–patient rela-
tionship is a confidential one, and a breach of confiden-
tiality is unethical unless it is necessary to protect the
public’s health.6 There is no exception to this rule for
Presidents or presidential candidates. This does not, of
course, mean that the President’s physicians can ethi-
cally or legally mislead the public about the health of
the President. Nonetheless, many have done so, and
these actions have led to increasing concern on the part
of the public and the press about the health of the Pres-
ident. Franklin Roosevelt, for example, was a sick man
during his third term, and the serious illness that led to
his death only months into his fourth term was thought
likely by his physicians before his reelection in 1944.7-9
Some of Dwight Eisenhower’s physicians thought he
had only about a 50-50 chance to survive a full second
term.9 The existence of John Kennedy’s Addison’s dis-
ease was purposely obfuscated before his election.8 And
the extent of Ronald Reagan’s health problems during
his first term was not made public until after he com-
pleted his second term.9
Presidents have not always been pleased with the in-
formation their physicians have released, even when
they authorized “complete disclosure.” Eisenhower, for
example, was greatly embarrassed when, after his first
heart attack, his physicians announced that he had had
“a good bowel movement.”9 And Reagan remained up-
set for years after one of his physicians at the National
Institutes of Health announced, “The President has
cancer,” after his operation for colon cancer, instead of
saying, “The President had cancer.”10 Presidential cam-
paigns, of course, are based not so much on descrip-
tions of the present as on predictions about the future.
And this is what makes them especially problematic in
terms of health information.
In the 1992 presidential election campaign, Paul
Tsongas’s history of cancer was central to his quest for
the Democratic Party’s nomination. Both he and two of
his physicians said he was “cancer-free” after a 1986
bone marrow transplantation for lymphoma at the
Dana–Farber Cancer Institute in Boston. Tsongas was
the first candidate for President to announce that he
had had cancer. A major question was whether the
American public would accept a survivor of cancer as a
candidate. After Tsongas suspended his unsuccessful
campaign, he and his physicians at Dana–Farber told
the press that he had actually had a recurrence of lym-
phoma in 1987, which had been successfully treated
with radiation. Shortly after this announcement, Tson-
gas wrote that if he should rejoin the campaign he
would make “all” his medical records available for
“public inspection” even though he thought that this
would set a precedent “that all candidates [would] have
to follow.”11 He wrote further that if there was any doubt
remaining, he would “submit to an examination by an
independent group of doctors,” something he thought
other candidates would then be forced to do as well.11
In fact, Tsongas never rejoined the race, and shortly
after the election he announced that his lymphoma had
recurred. He underwent treatment just before Bill Clin-
ton’s inauguration. Tsongas called on President-elect
Clinton to appoint a special commission to define what
should constitute full medical disclosure for presidential
candidates.12 Clinton has taken no action on this or any
other recommendation on making medical information
about presidential candidates public.
Commenting on the December 1992 disclosures by
Tsongas, Lawrence Altman wrote, “No less than the
outcome of the 1992 Presidential primaries, and thus
the election itself, could have been influenced by the
The New England Journal of Medicine 
Downloaded from nejm.org at BOSTON UNIVERSITY on November 16, 2021. For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
 Copyright © 1995 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. 
946 THE NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE Oct. 5, 1995
Dana–Farber doctors’ withholding of critical informa-
tion.”13 Tsongas had won the New Hampshire Demo-
cratic primary, and Altman believed that other candi-
dates might have performed better and “emerged in a
stronger position to challenge Bill Clinton for the nom-
ination” had the recurrence of cancer been disclosed.13
Of course, no one knows. Dana–Farber responded by
developing a new medical-disclosure policy for public
figures. It involves preparing a written summary of the
patient’s medical history, which the patient may review
but may not edit. If the patient approves, the statement
is made available to the press, and a hospital spokes-
person familiar with the relevant area of medicine —
not one of the treating physicians (who might face a
real or apparent conflict of interest in cases of full dis-
closure) — is made available to the press to comment
on the statement.13 This procedure is not too different
from the one followed by George Washington Universi-
ty Hospital after the attempted assassination of Presi-
dent Reagan. There was no contingency plan for an
attempted assassination, and so with the approval of
White House officials, the hospital appointed a sole
spokesperson to give bulletins on the President’s health
to the press. Reagan’s White House physician reviewed
these 27 press releases but made virtually no changes
in them.14
Whatever one thinks of the medical privacy of can-
didates for the presidency, both Eisenhower’s heart at-
tack and the attempt on Reagan’s life demonstrate that
Clinton was correct to assert, as a candidate, that the
health of the President is a more legitimate subject of
public concern than the health of candidates for the of-
fice. This does not mean, however, that the President’s
medical records or the President’s physician should
routinely be made available to the public, only that ad-
equate and accurate information should be supplied
when illness or injury strikes the President. Rumors
spread quickly when facts are not made available, as
Boris Yeltsin discovered during his hospitalization in
July 1995. Moreover, the provisions of the 25th Amend-
ment to the Constitution, which provides for the Presi-
dent’s disability, apply only to the President, not to can-
didates.
THE 25TH AMENDMENT
The transition of authority from President to Vice-
President in cases other than death or resignation, as
well as the possibility that the President and Congress
might need to fill a vacancy in the office of Vice-Presi-
dent, was not dealt with until the passage of the 25th
Amendment to the Constitution. Serious work on this
amendment began after President Eisenhower’s heart
attack, but it was not passed until after the assassination
of President Kennedy. The 25th Amendment provides
that when there is a vacancy in the office of Vice-Presi-
dent, the President “shall nominate a Vice President
who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority
vote of both Houses of Congress.” This procedure was
followed when President Richard Nixon nominated Ger-
ald Ford to replace Spiro Agnew and again when Presi-
dent Ford nominated Nelson Rockefeller to fill the va-
cancy left when Ford himself became President. Both
vacancies resulted from resignations in disgrace because
of illegal activities, not death or disability. Two other
sections of the amendment deal with the temporary
transfer of power to the Vice-President when the Presi-
dent is “unable to discharge the powers and duties of the
office.” This can be done either with or without the
President’s consent.
The provision for the voluntary transfer of power,
section 3, applies when the President will predictably be
temporarily unable to perform his or her duties, such as
when the President is out of communication with sub-
ordinates (with satellite communications, this no longer
seems to be an issue) or under or recovering from gen-
eral anesthesia. When the President transmits to the
House and the Senate a written declaration to this ef-
fect, the Vice-President becomes the “Acting Presi-
dent” until the President later transmits a written dec-
laration to the contrary. The only time this provision
has been used was when President Reagan underwent
surgery for colon cancer; Vice-President George Bush
was Acting President for approximately eight hours.15
President Reagan’s letter to Congress unfortunately
questioned whether the 25th Amendment was applica-
ble to “brief and temporary periods of incapacity” such
as his situation, although this was just the type of situ-
ation the amendment was meant to cover.9,14,16
Most of the controversy over presidential health has
involved discussions of when a President’s power can
be involuntarily removed because of physical or mental
incapacity. Specifically, section 4 of the 25th Amend-
ment provides that a declaration of the President’s in-
ability to “discharge the powers and duties of his office”
be transmitted to the House and the Senate by “a ma-
jority of either the principal officers of the executive de-
partments or of such other body as Congress may by
law provide.” The Vice-President then becomes the
Acting President until the President submits a written
declaration that he or she is able to resume the presi-
dential duties.
Physician commentators generally seem to favor get-
ting physicians more directly involved in monitoring
the health of the President. It has been suggested, for
example, that Congress should use its authority under
the 25th Amendment to set up a blue-ribbon national
panel of physicians to monitor the President’s health
and to make the referral to Congress if necessary.7,14
This procedure might have the advantage of taking the
initiation of such a referral out of the political realm,
where it may look like a betrayal by a disloyal Vice-
President and his or her supporters. But this is its dis-
advantage as well. Taking away the powers of the Pres-
ident involuntarily, even temporarily, is an issue that
should be decided in the political arena, because this is
the arena in which we determine who should be Presi-
dent. Nevertheless, most involuntary suspensions would
probably involve cases of mental instability or demen-
tia, and medical expertise in these areas would be es-
sential to making a reasonable evaluation of the Presi-
dent’s condition.
Proposals have accordingly been made that a mental
health unit be formed in the White House as part of the
medical office “to assist the White House physician in
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diagnosing and treating psychological problems.”17 The
desirability of such a unit has been described as “indis-
putable — as is the political impossibility.”18 Americans
still seem unable to accept a President who has had oc-
casion to consult a psychiatrist. Other proposals to
monitor the President’s health have also been widely
discussed. One is for Congress to create a broader,
standing “inability commission” of respected medical
experts and senior government officials. This proposal,
however, lost much of its momentum in 1958 when
Chief Justice Earl Warren sent a letter to Congress ad-
vising against putting any member of the Supreme
Court on such a commission.19
THE ROLE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PHYSICIAN
What role should the President’s White House phy-
sician have in making information about the Presi-
dent’s health available to the public in general, and in
making a determination of presidential disability in
particular? In terms of what should be disclosed to the
public, I agree with those who believe the White House
physician should act as the President’s personal physi-
cian and, as such, should be bound by the same rules
of confidentiality as all other physicians. Exceptions de-
signed to protect the public seem unnecessary, since the
President’s closest advisors and senior cabinet mem-
bers will certainly be aware of his or her ability to func-
tion mentally.
It has been suggested that the physician to a national
leader might have an obligation to disclose
when the leader is not competent to decide his own fate, as
for example in circumstances of dementia or severe functional
psychiatric disorders, such as mania or severe depression;
when the leader is about to commit a major act of illegality
because of medical impairment; and when the leader is about
to commit a grossly immoral act because of medical impair-
ment.7
Although the first of these three cases is potentially
compatible with both medical ethics and the 25th
Amendment, it is unnecessary, and the latter two fall
outside the role and expertise of physicians. They in-
volve interpreting the law and acting as a judge of the
President’s morals, areas in which medical expertise is
not useful.
The White House medical unit was expanded under
President George Bush to include four physicians (a
physician to the President and three White House phy-
sicians) as well as five physician’s assistants and five
nurses.14 Like Bush, President Clinton has developed a
detailed contingency plan for implementing the provi-
sions of the 25th Amendment, which spells out the role
of the physician to the President in this process. The
plan is classified. It is, of course, good to have such a
plan; the fact that it is classified, however, makes it
impossible to tell how sound the plan is. In any event,
the primary role of the physician to the President, who
is usually chosen more for political connections than for
medical prowess, should be in assembling the appropri-
ate specialists needed to make an accurate diagnosis of
the President’s condition and to determine the progno-
sis. It is not the physician’s job to determine whether
the condition makes the President unable to discharge
his or her duties. If the senior staff and Cabinet mem-
bers believe the President can perform his or her duties,
who is the physician to disagree? This is different from
the situation in which a physician treating an airline pi-
lot or school-bus driver is the only one who is aware
that the patient’s medical condition poses a risk to the
public. In such a case, if the patient will not voluntarily
cease the dangerous activities, the physician may dis-
close to the patient’s employer information that is nec-
essary to protect the public.6
Although physicians cannot predict with any degree
of certainty how a candidate’s medical condition will af-
fect his or her ability to perform politically, the public
may take very seriously their views on the likelihood of
death or disability in office. President Eisenhower, for
example, had to make a decision about running for a
second term after his heart attack. His most famous
cardiac consultant, Paul Dudley White, found himself
in a position where he could essentially have had veto
power over the decision by saying publicly that Eisen-
hower should not run for reelection because of his
health.9 White did try privately to persuade Eisenhower
not to run (and instead become the world “ambassador
for peace”) but ultimately accepted that the final deci-
sion should be made by the President, not the Presi-
dent’s physician.9 Eisenhower had many medical prob-
lems during his second term, but he survived them all
and lived another eight years after he left office.
The first clear signs of bladder cancer were not found
in Hubert Humphrey until 1969, after he had lost the
1968 presidential election to Richard Nixon. It has been
suggested that had molecular diagnostic techniques
been available, they could have detected the aggressive
cancer by May 1967 and that if Humphrey had known
about it, “he might have withdrawn from the presiden-
tial race.”20 Whether to withdraw, however, should have
been Vice-President Humphrey’s decision, not that of
his physicians. Humphrey died in 1978.
LIMITS ON PUBLIC CURIOSITY?
Presidential candidate Paul Tsongas suggested that
by making public all medical records and submitting to
a medical examination by an expert medical panel, any
presidential candidate could force all the other presi-
dential candidates to do the same. To the extent that
Tsongas was right, presidential candidates wind up
playing a public game of chicken with their medical
records and thus their medical privacy. Clinton’s posi-
tion as a candidate is the proper one: there should be
limits on what presidential candidates should be ex-
pected to disclose about their physical and mental
health. These limits cannot be imposed by law (since
the candidates could always make voluntary disclo-
sures) but must be imposed by the candidates them-
selves, and by their advisers and physicians. If these
limits are seen as reasonable, they will be respected by
the public even if they are challenged by the media,
which seem much more interested in private medical
information than the public is. The public will learn
much more about a candidate’s fitness for the presiden-
cy by the candidate’s performance in the campaign21
than by the release of his or her medical records. More-
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over, the public is likely to be best served by candidates
and Presidents who seek medical care when they need
it, without fear that doing so will jeopardize their polit-
ical future.
Some medical information is obvious or nonstigma-
tizing, and its disclosure is probably harmless. Both
Clinton and Dole, for example, have made public their
serum cholesterol levels, weight, and blood pressure,
and these numbers have already been used in presiden-
tial politics. Senator Dole remarked at the July 1995
meeting of the National Governors’ Association, “My
weight is lower than Clinton’s. My cholesterol is lower
than Clinton’s. My blood pressure is lower than Clin-
ton’s. But I am not going to make health an issue in
1996.”22 Clinton, who spoke to the same gathering a
few hours later, said that he believed his resting pulse
rate was actually lower than Dole’s, but that this was
not Dole’s fault because “I don’t have to deal with Phil
Gramm every day.”22 However, to the extent that cho-
lesterol levels and weight are used as measures of vir-
tue, all this is nonsense and is likely to distract us from
focusing on the substantive policy differences between
the candidates.
Much more serious issues are raised by sensitive
medical information that is inherently embarrassing or
invites irrational prejudice. The fact of having consult-
ed a psychiatrist is one such area, and I believe this
should not be disclosed by candidates. A history of in-
stitutional mental health care is even more prejudicial,
as the Eagleton case illustrates. We should encourage
our leaders to seek such help whenever they feel they
need it, both for their own sakes and for ours, and pro-
tecting their medical privacy is essential if this is to
happen. Three other types of sensitive information also
deserve attention. The first is abortion. Since there
have been few women candidates for the presidency,
this issue has not yet come up; we should agree now
that it never should. The second is status with respect
to the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Presiden-
tial candidates may, of course, wish to know their own
HIV status, but there seems no reason for anyone other
than their personal physicians and their sexual part-
ners to know it. Of course, at some point AIDS may
develop in an HIV-positive person, and this would be
difficult, if not impossible, to keep secret. The only sug-
gested rationale for presidential candidates to be tested
for HIV is that this test is routine in the military and
the President will be the commander-in-chief of the
armed services.1 But the military reasons (saving on
disability benefits and — incredibly — the possibility of
a battlefield transfusion) do not apply to the President.
Third, and perhaps most important, there is an en-
tire new set of tests — genetic tests — that will soon
become available and will be able to make at least some
probabilistic, though not definitive, estimates of the
odds of a person’s having certain diseases, such as ear-
ly-onset Alzheimer’s disease, breast cancer, and colon
cancer.23,24 These tests have the potential for much mis-
chief in presidential politics. Their results could be used
to play to the fears and prejudices of the electorate,
even though by themselves they cannot accurately pre-
dict how good or bad a President will be or whether the
person will be able to do the job. Everyone will die, and
if they live long enough will die of a genetically influ-
enced disease, because we all carry at least some genes
predisposing us to death and mental disability. It would
be pointless and distracting to search for those that
evoke the most fear in the electorate, since this is a re-
flection not of the fitness of a person for the presidency
but of our own fears of death and disability. A good rule
to adopt now is for candidates (and their physicians and
advisors) to put the results of genetic tests off limits in
any disclosure of the health status of a candidate or of
a President.
CONCLUSIONS
Senator Eugene McCarthy was right to protect his
medical privacy in the 1976 presidential campaign. He
was also right to insist that a President be elected “on
the basis of his or her record of service, of thought
about the issues and programs to deal with them, and
not on the basis of any private status such as that of
patient.”3 U.S. Presidents have always been more likely
to be killed or disabled by assassins than by diseases,
and the Secret Service thus has more to do with the
President’s health and safety than the President’s phy-
sicians.
The things we want to know about the health of
Presidents and presidential candidates tell us much
more about ourselves than about the Presidents and
would-be Presidents. They tell us what we fear, and
what we hope for. Reasonable medical disclosures are
now taken for granted and may not be too harmful. But
we are rapidly approaching the point of diminishing re-
turns, and unless we want to discourage our Presidents,
presidential candidates, and possible presidential candi-
dates from seeking medical assistance in times of phys-
ical and psychological distress, we must show at least
some respect for their medical privacy by setting limits
to expected disclosures. There is no simple legal or pro-
cedural rule that can ensure this. The 25th Amendment
provides what is probably as good a set of procedures
as we can devise to deal with temporary presidential
disability. Presidents will have to disclose the details of
actual injuries and illnesses in office. But the 1996 elec-
tion provides an opportunity for us to begin to curb our
tabloid-press–fed curiosity about the private medical
information of presidential candidates. We should take
this opportunity; it may be our last.
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AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A FACE
By Lucy Grealy. 223 pp. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1995.
$19.95. ISBN 0-395-65780-6.
Although physicians understand how a patient’s definition
of self and identity may be bound to the face, in Autobiography
of a Face, Lucy Grealy writes about this topic from a unique
and sobering perspective. At the age of 9, she underwent a
partial mandibulectomy for Ewing’s sarcoma, followed by 21⁄2
years of chemotherapy and radiation treatments. In her book,
written when she was in her 20s, Grealy describes the daily
burden of physical and emotional pain she bears and explores
how this helped define her persona.
Whether trying to eat after chemotherapy or withstand the
jeers of boys in junior high school, Grealy struggled every day
to maintain her dignity and self-awareness. She captures how
a physician can so easily instill hope or destroy confidence.
Her description of failed nasal intubation is alarming. Neither
nostril was patent, “so they decided to go straight through my
mouth. This required prying my mouth open and keeping it
open, which hurt like hell, but worse was that at each attempt
to pass the tube, my airway was temporarily blocked and I
couldn’t breathe, which put me into a panic.” Grealy does not
fault the medical establishment. Rather, her graceful and ar-
ticulate prose describing a physician’s routine reminds us of
the sensitivity we must exercise in caring for patients. She has
hope and faith in her physicians, who offer her a microvascu-
lar free-flap reconstruction. Grealy writes:
Maybe life was going to be all right after all. . . . What
would it be like to walk down the street and be able to trust
that no one would say anything nasty to me? My only clues
were from Halloween and from the winter, when I could
wrap up the lower half of my face in a scarf and talk to peo-
ple who had no idea that my beauty was a lie, a trick that
would be exposed the minute I had to take off the scarf.
Unfortunately, the flap reabsorbed, leaving Grealy thinking:
“I felt like such a fool. I’d been walking around with a secret
notion of promised beauty, and here was the reality.”
As surgeons we like to believe we understand how our craft
can affect a person’s identity; as physicians we like to believe
we understand the psychology of self-definition and self-per-
ception; and as human beings we like to believe we under-
stand how our words can comfort and can even soften the
blows from disease and treatments. Grealy, however, forces us
to look through her eyes and see her face. We are not as gen-
tle as we would like to think.
Grealy describes how her self-awareness and identity
evolved. As doctors, we can only benefit from her candid
thoughts and better understand how our words and actions
help mold patients’ perceptions of themselves. Finally, after
arriving at a cosmetic solution, Grealy asks: “Where was all
that relief and freedom that I thought came with beauty?” It
is only after Grealy scrutinizes her inner self — that is, her
personality, beliefs, and emotions — that the importance of
her appearance fades and her true beauty is revealed.
ROSS I.S. ZBAR, M.D.
Iowa City, IA 52242 University of Iowa
REOPERATIVE AESTHETIC AND RECONSTRUCTIVE 
PLASTIC SURGERY
Edited by James C. Grotting. 1661 pp. in two volumes, illus-
trated. St. Louis, Quality Medical, 1995. $395. ISBN 0-942219-
25-2.
Never before has an entire textbook been devoted to the
subject of reoperative surgery. Usually the subject is covered
in a few paragraphs at the end of a chapter. Yet, as pointed
out in the foreword of Reoperative Aesthetic and Reconstructive
Plastic Surgery, “all surgeons face reoperations as a routine
part of their practices.” These reoperations are necessary to
refine results, manage complications, or complete the final
stage of a sequential procedure. The reoperative setting often
tests even the most seasoned surgeon’s skill and integrity. As
stated in the preface, “The thread of commonality uniting all
reoperative surgery is that the plastic surgeon finds himself
confronting tissue planes biologically altered by the effects of
wound healing.”
Editors of multiauthored textbooks face a real challenge to
maintain uniformity of quality. The editor of this book states
that he has attempted “to draw on the cumulative experience
of master surgeons to increase our chances of obtaining a fa-
vorable result.” He has succeeded in doing just that. He has
fashioned a mix of contributors consisting of senior profes-
sors, private practitioners, and plastic-surgery residents and
fellows while maintaining a uniform approach and an excel-
lent level of quality. The effort succeeds in part because of his
supervision of manuscript preparation and in part because of
his contributions as author or coauthor of nine chapters.
This book is much more than its title suggests. In order to
foster a discussion of the philosophy, planning, and tech-
nique of reoperation, each author has reviewed the anatomy
and blood and nerve supply of a specific body part and out-
lined the principles of the initial operation leading to the re-
quirement for reoperation. This background and the clarity
with which it is presented make this one of the most readable
textbooks on plastic and reconstructive surgery. The illustra-
tions are outstanding. Very clear drawings combined with
color prints allow the reader to visualize what the text at-
tempts to convey.
Having surgeons such as Horton discuss reconstruction of
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